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As a concept, the CubeSat class of satellites is over 15 years old. The first CubeSat satellites were launched in 2003 
and a few more in 2006. In recent years, CubeSats have proliferated at an astonishing rate. What started as a largely 
academic exercise has taken on much greater significance, with commercial entities gearing up to produce vast 
constellations of the small but capable spacecraft. Amidst all the hype one fact tends to get overlooked: CubeSats do 
not have a great record of mission success. This presentation provides simple, actionable recommendations that 
should improve the likelihood of mission success for future CubeSat development projects. The recommendations 
were gleaned from a study across academic, commercial and government organizations engaged in the design and 
development of miniature spacecraft. These organizations generously shared their processes, circumstances, results, 
and lessons learned; they also shared their current processes and philosophies on design, testing, and mission 
assurance. The results highlighted a number of important themes and issues, all of which formed the basis for the 
eight recommendations. Most of the recommendations can be tailored and implemented without much cost, and 
many seem to be common sense—though the study team found that few CubeSat developers followed them all. This 
paper specifically looks at the research process, the recurring themes and the eight recommendations to improve 
mission success of CubeSats. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the rate of CubeSat launches increases each year, the 
community is seeing more diversity in the types of 
missions being developed by industry, academia, and 
government. Each of these missions have different 
expectations that have impacts to testing, risk 
management, and program oversite.1,2 What is common 
among the missions is that mission success is important 
and there are greater expectations that missions will 
succeed. So how does the community achieve greater 
mission success and still follow the CubeSat ideal of 
low-cost, off-the-shelf parts, and agile development 
cycles? 
This was the problem statement for the study, 
“Improving Mission Success of CubeSats” under the 
2017 Mission Assurance Improvement Workshop 
(MAIW). The study team consisted of 13 members 
across government and industry that came together to 
address this topic. The MAIW is a community of 
practice that brings together the U.S. Space Industry to 
explore and document best practices and common 
approaches to mission assurance. 2017 was the 10th 
year of the workshop. 
This paper describes the methodology and process of 
the study, presents the themes distilled from a 
compilation of lessons learned gathered from the 
interviews, and proposes eight recommendations that 
will help the CubeSat community improve mission 
success.  
METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS 
The research methodology for the study consisted of a 
straight forward process (Figure 1) of research 
preparation, collecting data, analyzing the data, and 
publishing results to help the CubeSat community 
improve probability of mission success. 
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Figure 1: A systematic, straightforward process was 
followed for this study 
Research Preparation 
Preparation began with a literature survey of papers and 
presentations about CubeSat successes and failures.  In 
addition to understanding historical problems, the team 
wanted to ensure the MAIW topic was not replicating 
existing research, which was verified.  This research 
also helped development of a questionnaire that was 
used to interview CubeSat organizations.  Dry run 
interviews within the team were used to improve the 
questionnaire and practice for the many interviews that 
were planned. The final set of questions used were the 
following: 
1. How many CubeSats has your organization 
built? Out of those built, how many have 
flown? Were the missions successful, where 
mission success is defined as achievement of 
the desired mission performance over intended 
design life? 
2. Describe one (or more) of your recent CubeSat 
missions. Was it successful? What do you 
think contributed most to its success? If not 
successful, what would you do differently? 
3. What is the experience level of your team?  
4. Do the team members change over often or are 
the team members consistent for long periods 
of time? 
5. What were the customer expectations and risk 
tolerance level (low, medium, high)? Did their 
expectations change with time? 
6. Please list the major reviews that occurred for 
the project (i.e. PDR, CDR, etc.) Did your 
customer participate in these reviews? Did you 
have independent reviewers participating? 
7. What type of reviews do you perform before 
approving a detailed design (mechanical, 
electrical or software)? Do you perform any 
independent peer reviews? 
8. What performance analyses were done? What 
tests were done? 
9. What test or process do you consider essential 
to CubeSat success? What would be the 
second most important test / process? What 
test or process would you eliminate if you 
could? What did you think was not value-
added? 
These questions were devised to gather some statistical 
data, but more importantly the team made a number of 
the questions open ended to spark candid conversations 
about experiences and lessons learned. This proved to 
be the most valuable information collected.  
The team identified 57 candidate organizations from 
academia, industry and government with CubeSat 
development experience. In the end however, the team 
held only 23 interviews (Table 1): MAIW process 
deadlines and team personnel availability precluded 
more interviews.  Discussions with foreign entities were 
avoided, due to ITAR constraints. 
Table 1: Organizations Interviewed 
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Interview Process 
The MAIW team split up into smaller sub-teams to 
efficiently schedule and execute the interviews and 
follow-up, as necessary.  When the interviews were 
scheduled, the sub-teams explained objectives and the 
process, and provided the list of questions well in 
advance. The sub-teams introduced the team members 
participating in the interview.  The MAIW team made 
sure that participants understood that: 
• We would not ask, nor did we want to receive, 
any proprietary information    
• None of the raw data would be released 
outside of the topic team 
• The "aggregate" data and analysis from the 
interviews will be made available in a 
publicly releasable report 
The organization being interviewed was encouraged to 
bring everyone needed who could answer the questions 
provided.  The MAIW lead assigned to that interview 
directed the questioning.  At least two MAIW team 
members were present for each interview, many times 
there were three or more.  Each person wrote notes and 
after the interview concluded, the lead would compile 
the notes into a single account.  That final summary 
was sent to the interviewee for approval and correction.  
The approved and corrected notes were archived.   
Most interviews were performed via telecon, however 
whenever it was convenient, face-to-face conversations 
occurred.   In addition to the interview questions, the 
conversations often led to additional discussions to 
further understand processes, ground test issues, and 
on-orbit anomalies.  
Analysis Process 
The interviews resulted in 415 pages of information.  
This was distilled in a spreadsheet where we identified 
common themes and theme categories.  The MAIW 
then met in one location to reach a final consensus: 40 
distinct common trends that fell into 8 theme categories 
and subsequently produced 8 recommendations on how 
to improve mission success of CubeSats.    
Report Generation 
A draft report was generated by the MAIW team and 
reviewed by a panel of 17 Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs).   The SMEs were selected from the 
interviewees and others with action authority in the 
field.  This process resulted in 190 actionable 
comments that were adjudicated with the SMEs and 
incorporated into the final report.  The final report 
followed the MAIW approval and public release 
processes.  
INTERVIEW STATISTICS 
The interview results were analyzed to help the 
CubeSat community improve probability of mission 
success.  A top level statistical analysis provided some 
insight during this process.  The following data is 
primarily from the interviews, with minor additions 
from online sources. “Lessons learned” were 
volunteered by the interviewees. Both quantitative and 
qualitative data was obtained and assessed.  Responses 
to the qualitative questions often included discussions 
that addressed on-orbit anomalies and potential 
corrective actions.  
For purposes of this assessment, the satellites were 
segregated into two size groups: 
1. Group 1 = 1U (1.33 kg) to 27U (36 kg) 
Picosats/Nanosats 
2. Group 2 = >27U to 200 kg 
Microsats/Smallsats 
The development, launch, and on-orbit experiences for 
Group 1 spanned a time frame from 2002 to 2016. The 
Smallsats in Group 2 include programs from the 1980s 
and 1990s.  
Basic Data Set  
Figure 2 summarizes the satellites being built, awaiting 
launch or that have flown by the 23 organizations 
interviewed.  This is the basic data set used in the 
analysis.  The data is segregated by the two group sizes, 
as listed above.  Because the development process is 
valuable to this study, we included satellites that were 
currently being built in the statistics with those already 
built and launched.   Of the 242 satellites that have been 
built or were being built at the time of the interview, 
only 95 arrived in orbit and 18 were lost during launch. 
 
Figure 2: Satellites built and flown by respondents 
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Mission Status 
Figure 3 summarizes the interview respondent 
assessments of mission success for their satellites that 
achieved orbit.  One can observe that the larger class 
Smallsats have been more successful than the CubeSat 
group.   
Figure 3: Mission status by size 
We compared our Group 1 CubeSat data set (94 
CubeSats) with a CubeSat database (288 CubeSats) 
developed through research performed by Dr. 
Swartwout at St Louis University as of Spring 2017 
(Figure 4)3.  Some observations include: 
• Rough correlation exists for launch failures 
and early loss categories 
• Many more DOA (Dead on Arrival) cases are 
observed in the larger dataset 
• The interviewees appear to have more partial 
and full successes, possibly due to these 
organizations having more experience with 
lessons learned from multiple missions 
Figure 4: Comparison to related CubeSat research 
Anomaly Discussions 
During the course of the interviews many of the 
respondents described anomalies and offered their 
opinions on the root causes.  There were 27 anomalies 
out of the 94 satellites that were discussed and various 
levels of root cause assessments were performed.  
These discussions in many cases identified multiple 
contributors to the problems as shown in Figure 5.  It 
was also noted that if more ground testing had been 
performed, it could have identified some or all of the 
other issues. 
 
Figure 5: 27 anomalies were discussed during 
interviews 
THEMES 
During the interviews, many themes emerged. These 
were concepts, practices, and observations made by the 
interviewees which stood out, either due to their 
pertinence or their frequency. Many of the themes were 
common across industry, academia, and government, 
and most of the themes are broadly applicable to all 
missions regardless of mission resources or success 
criteria. To preserve confidentiality, the themes and 
observations are not attributed to companies or 
agencies.  
Theme #1: Setting the Purpose and Vision of the 
Mission 
Different agencies have different visions for the 
CubeSats they build. Some see them as educational 
tools for students, some see them as “lab benches in 
space,” and some see them as capable platforms for 
potentially complex missions. Several interviewees 
encountered mismatches between the resources of the 
developer and the expectations of the customer. In 
some cases, the customer’s expectations were out of 
line with the funding and resources available to the 
developer. In other cases, the developer was overly 
optimistic about what could be accomplished given the 
resources available. “At first, we had very simple 
expectations. Then as the requirements changed, we got 
in over our heads,” one commented.  
For academic institutions, student education is often the 
primary measure of mission success; while a successful 
launch and on-orbit campaign is always desired, getting 
to delivery is considered the major achievement. Many 
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academic developers will launch regardless of 
readiness. As one such developer stated, “we’d rather 
take a 5% chance of it working, than a 0% chance of it 
ever launching.” Because of this, industry observers 
must be careful when interpreting success rates.  
CubeSats have relatively high failure rates in part 
because such developers are willing to take big risks.  
Many interviewees commented on the negative 
implications of “scope creep.” One interviewee 
discussed how a simple-seeming science change to a 
mission led to redesign of the electronics board, noting 
that “little decisions early on make a big impact at the 
end.” Interviewees recommended establishing (and 
defending) a minimum baseline mission and having a 
de-scope plan in place should circumstances require it. 
Two academic institutions credited their strong systems 
engineering approach—and extreme resistance to scope 
creep—for their mission success. “Limit complexity, 
and test extensively,” one stated. There is a need to 
define upfront what mission success actually means to 
all parties, and to communicate this to key stakeholders 
from the beginning to the end of the program.4,5,6 
Theme #2: Establishing the Program Structure 
Team composition, system engineering practices, and 
review approach varied among CubeSat developers and 
from academia to industry. Not unexpectedly, academic 
institutions had the highest team member turnover rate 
due to graduation. For academic teams in particular, 
having an experienced mentor was important. From the 
limited interview data, it appears that among academic 
institutions, the more experienced the mentor, the 
greater the success rate. Many mentors came from 
industry and applied the lessons learned from industry 
to their academic programs. 
Many interviewees felt that process documentation was 
more important, not less, with inexperienced teams, and 
with teams that turnover frequently. One academic 
institution with a good success record stated, “We use 
formal shop orders, good as-built discipline, and good 
as-tested documentation. These help with transferring 
knowledge between students during turnover.” 
Similarly, interviewees noted that documentation 
becomes more important as teams and companies grow-
in-size, to maintain corporate culture through changing 
times. One industry developer noted that as the 
company grew, “We started to lose institutional 
knowledge through confusion.” 
Most of the respondents followed the typical 
government/industry review cycle (Preliminary Design 
Review, Critical Design Review, etc.), though in many 
academic cases, these reviews were tied to the 
academic calendar, rather than project milestones. The 
value of the major reviews was debated.  Most 
academic institutions thought it helpful to expose 
students to industry practices and several interviewees 
felt that the major reviews helped identify disconnects, 
especially with external partners. Interviewees also 
pointed out that major reviews sometimes provide 
useful deadlines to drive design decisions to closure. 
On the other hand, major reviews take resources away 
from engineering – something that is hard to tolerate in 
low-resource programs. The use of less formal, but 
rigorous peer reviews was considered more value-
added. Respondents noted that review style is not 
always up to the program. Review approach and 
formality are sometimes dictated by the customer and 
interviewees recommended working with the customer 
to understand their expectations and come to a mutually 
agreeable review strategy. 
Nearly every academic institution—and several 
government and industry agencies—commented on the 
“time crunch factor” in CubeSat schedules. Launches 
will typically not wait for a CubeSat and teams were 
often overly optimistic on design timelines. This put 
extreme pressure on the latter half of the schedule, 
including assembly and test—something that nearly 
every institution considers critical. Several institutions 
attributed their on-orbit failures to incomplete testing 
due to insufficient time and recommended dedicating 
half of a development schedule to testing from the 
outset.  
Theme #3: The Risk Process 
Many respondents felt that a good risk process is even 
more important for CubeSat missions than for larger, 
Class A missions. Risk-based mission assurance allows 
programs with low resources to get the most “bang for 
the buck.” “You don’t have the resources to focus on 
everything,” said one interviewee. “Pick and choose 
based on risk, not on gut feel or emotion.” One 
interviewee advocated determining the “cost to risk-
reduction ratio” of design, integration, and test 
activities. Specifically, when choosing which analyses 
to do, tests to perform, and processes to implement, 
CubeSat developers should consider the ratio between 
programmatic risk (increased cost, delayed schedule) 
and technical risk (on-orbit failure). Teams make the 
most effective use of limited resources by focusing on 
the work with the lowest programmatic to technical risk 
ratios.  
Respondents called out flight software as a particularly 
risky area. For CubeSats, flight software is often the 
most complex subsystem on the satellite and is 
notoriously difficult to analyze. Interviewees repeatedly 
stressed the importance of early functional testing of 
flight software. Robust safe modes and the ability to 
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patch or reprogram software on orbit, also helps reduce 
risk.  
Theme #4: Design and Analysis 
For CubeSats, it is particularly important to design for 
simplicity and robustness. The funding and timelines 
required for complicated designs do not fit the 
stereotypical “rapid and inexpensive” CubeSat 
paradigm. Tri-fold wings, expensive payloads, capable 
pointing, directional antennas, and other complex 
systems, all add risk to CubeSat missions. Simple 
designs, by contrast, have fewer failure modes and are 
more likely to be achievable within the scope of a 
typical CubeSat program. Interviewees recommended 
keeping deployables simple, having minimal or no 
attitude control, and sticking to low data and power 
requirements to improve the chances of mission 
success.  
CubeSat parts are mostly commercial and not designed 
for the space radiation environment.  Interviewees 
mentioned that watchdog timers and other fail-safe 
devices that reset components automatically, helped 
their CubeSat missions succeed. CubeSat missions 
typically use non-radiation-hardened parts, which can 
latch-up. “Have many ways to reset the satellite,” 
recommends one respondent. Some developers reset 
their on-orbit missions every 24 hours as a 
precautionary measure.  
A CubeSat’s small size makes it hard to de-integrate, 
repair, and re-integrate. Furthermore, most CubeSats 
undergo little to no subsystem-level testing.  As a 
result, issues are usually discovered while testing the 
fully assembled satellite. “A lot of time was wasted on 
integration and de-integration… if something needed to 
change, we had to take the whole thing apart,” observed 
one developer. Designing for disassembly and using a 
larger form factor than needed can keep these risks low. 
One university deliberately built a 1.5U satellite into a 
3U form factor – the extra space allowed for easier 
assembly and re-work. Another bought a separate set of 
boards, conducted any needed repairs on the bench, and 
then replaced the entire board on the CubeSat, rather 
than disassembling the CubeSat and repairing the flight 
board directly.  
Theme #5: Test, Test, Test – the Importance of 
Testing 
Every organization interviewed emphasized the 
importance of testing, especially full-system functional 
testing. When asked what test they considered the most 
critical to CubeSat success, most organizations pointed 
to end-to-end functional testing. “Immediately directly 
useful are end-to-end functional demonstrations starting 
as early as possible,” stated one respondent. One 
organization created an entire laboratory devoted to 
realistic day-in-the-life testing, including a GPS 
simulator, star field simulator, and a Helmholtz cage. 
Even if such resources are not available, organizations 
can demonstrate much of the on-orbit functionality of a 
CubeSat through day-in-the-life testing. 
One organization that works extensively with university 
satellites recommends four tests following assembly, 
and before environmental testing: 
• A command execution test, where all 
commands are sent to the satellite and checked 
for correct execution; 
• A day-in-the-life test, where a typical 24-hour 
period on-orbit is simulated; 
• An end-to-end communications test, where the 
ground system is used to command the 
spacecraft over radio frequency links; 
• A complete power system charge cycle, where 
the battery is discharged to its full depth of 
discharge through satellite operations and then 
recharged using the solar panels. 
These four tests demonstrate basic functionality and can 
typically be conducted without elaborate test 
equipment.  
Some academic institutions debated the value of 
thermal vacuum (TVAC) testing. Thermal vacuum 
chambers are expensive equipment, and often not 
present in a university CubeSat laboratory.  
Furthermore, TVAC testing is time consuming to set up 
and difficult to execute properly.  Developers without 
access to a TVAC facility relied solely on ambient-
pressure thermal testing.  They believed that functional 
testing at temperature extremes provided nearly the 
same value, for less cost.  However, TVAC testing 
accurately emulates the space environment, including 
the absence of air, which eliminates convective cooling.  
One respondent observed that testing in TVAC would 
have found a mission crippling error.  Another 
respondent did find an error and corrected it prior to 
shipment – that error also would have ended the 
mission.   
Deployment testing was also debated; while nearly 
everyone agreed that critical deployables should be 
tested in flight-like conditions, many pointed out that 
these tests can be hard to conduct. Some deployment 
mechanisms cannot be reset or can only be used a 
limited number of times, which makes it hard to test 
them extensively.  The root cause of several CubeSat 
failures has been attributed to deployments. 
Venturini 7 32nd Annual AIAA/USU 
  Conference on Small Satellites 
The lack of time for testing, and the tendency for test 
time to be squeezed to make a launch date, was 
frequently re-emphasized, as was the importance of 
software testing.  
Theme #6: Common CubeSat Failures 
During the interviews, the team collected a list of 
common CubeSat failures and subsystems worthy of 
more attention. These included: 
• The communication system. Not only were 
communication system failures common (and 
typically mission-ending), it was hard for 
CubeSat developers to find a good ground 
segment.  
• The power system. Interviewees noted that the 
actual performance of purchased power 
systems did not always match specifications.  
They also warned that power systems should 
be tested in their intended configuration. 
• Deployables, such as solar panels and 
antennas. Burn-wire systems are sensitive to 
workmanship and are not easily resettable. 
Testing deployables like-you-fly is difficult 
and time-consuming.  
These subsystems, therefore, warrant greater attention 
and analysis.  
Theme #7: Parts Quality, Availability, and 
Documentation 
A number of interviewees brought up issues with 
CubeSat parts and subsystems. CubeSat missions 
typically use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) standard 
assemblies and components, due to their low cost and 
lead time. These have sometimes proven unsuitable for 
the expected space environment and the performance of 
COTS components does not always match 
specifications.  Inexperienced CubeSat developers do 
not have the history to know when additional testing is 
advisable and which parts are trustworthy.  
CubeSat standard assemblies and components are often 
poorly or inaccurately documented.  “It’s hard to find 
information on COTS parts,” stated one developer.  
“They come with poor user manuals and teams are 
learning as they go.” In many cases, testing was 
necessary to flesh out the differences between the 
specification sheets and reality. “Even though the 
CubeSat philosophy tends to de-emphasize 
documentation,” one interviewee stated, “having up-to-
date vetted documentation from vendors, delivered on 
time and with the proper revisions, would make a big 
difference.”  
CubeSat standard components are commercial and not 
designed specifically for space.  Interviewees also 
recommended overstocking spare parts and using part 
derating to improve margin.7,8 Spare parts will allow 
additional targeted component testing and protect 
schedule if a part fails during system-level tests. 
Theme #8: Launch is a Significant Driver 
Launch schedule pressure is a major risk driver on 
CubeSats and it ripples into much of the decision-
making during a typical program. CubeSat programs 
are often secondary rideshares, with little flexibility in 
the launch date.  At the end of the program, the 
important system-level testing often gets “crunched” 
because CubeSats must meet a launch delivery 
deadline. The result is incomplete or inadequate testing. 
“We need to spend more time in AI&T [assembly, 
integration, and test],” one developer said, “but we 
can’t afford to miss the launch. So, we ship at the 
delivery date, regardless of maturity.” 
Launch delays are also a problem. In one case, a failed 
solar array passed all testing, but there was a long-time 
delay and significant handling of the spacecraft before 
launch. It is believed that this led to a broken 
mechanism. Another government organization’s 
satellite sat unpowered on the International Space 
Station for seven months before deployment.  It is 
believed that the delay degraded their batteries.  Launch 
delays can also put pressure on budgets and schedules, 
encouraging customers to add more capability.  One 
industry developer uses a “deliver to self” paradigm, 
instead of “delivering to a launch provider.”   
CubeSats are typically required to follow stringent “do 
no harm” guidelines. Integrators therefore require 
multiple-redundant inhibit systems designed to keep a 
CubeSat from powering up before launch. “Inhibits are 
… single-point failures with unknown reliability. A $26 
set of parts can take down your whole mission,” 
observed one interviewee. Another pointed out that, “A 
Class A mission would never put in a switch they 
couldn’t work around.”  
Launch vehicle environments for CubeSats are often 
severe.  As a secondary payload that is intended to be 
no threat to the primary payload, the dispensers are 
relegated to places on the rocket away from the fairing.  
Some launch environments are significantly worse than 
others, and CubeSats rarely know until after CDR what 
launch vehicle they will use. Accounting for various 
launch vehicle vibration levels can result in overdesign 
and wasted effort. One academic satellite designed to 
the expected vibration environment, and then was given 
a new, higher environment from the launch vehicle; re-
testing was challenging. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the themes and lessons learned, the team 
produced eight recommendations.  They are intended to 
improve the success of CubeSat developers.  In this 
section, each recommendation is offered along with an 
explanation about why it is important and how it might 
be implemented effectively.  The degree of 
implementation correlates to the amount of risk retired. 
Although recommendations may appear to be general 
knowledge and common sense, it was rare to find a 
team that followed all actions.  Most of these can be 
implemented with minimal increased cost to a program, 
while moving the program towards higher levels of 
mission success.   
Recommendation #1: Define your scope, goals, 
and success criteria at program start.  Justify your 
ability to complete it within the available time, budget, 
and resources. During project life cycle, defend it 
aggressively against growth.  
Scope creep is a problem on all missions, but for 
CubeSats, which are smaller and typically more cost 
and resource constrained, there is even less room to 
accommodate changes. A project is sold to customers 
as a capability for a certain cost – a certain vision and 
expectation are transferred and must be recorded as a 
governing document.  As a project evolves and risks are 
discovered, the costs become more defined and the 
price grows inevitably more expensive.   
Interviewees stressed that CubeSat developers – and 
sometimes their customers – tend to be overly 
optimistic about what these small, low-cost platforms 
can achieve and unrealistic about the difficulty in 
realizing their desired functionality and expected 
reliability. CubeSat customers are new to the satellite 
business and will not appreciate that cost increases 
always occur.  In contrast, experienced teams, before 
the ink from their signature on the contract is dry, 
immediately look for ways to reduce scope to hedge 
against the certain cost growth - they never add scope, 
without a contract increase.  Therefore, learning from 
years of evolutionary behavior development that has, 
not surprisingly, been reflected in the responses to this 
survey, it is recommended that project leadership and 
customers define scope, goals, and success criteria at 
the start of a program and stop there, unless additional 
funding is added to the contract.   
It’s critical that the funding match the desired 
complexity, reliability, and purpose of the mission, and 
vice-versa.  During the project lifecycle, the contractor 
project management must defend the original scope 
against growth and in addition, if the customer does not 
have financial reserves, then have a graceful descope 
plan, to make up for future time and funding shortfalls. 
Budget estimates should have significant margins 
because the development teams are usually young and 
therefore without prior satellite development experience 
to correct for the misperception that CubeSats are easy 
to realize because they are small.  
Recommendation #2: Conduct risk-based mission 
assurance. Perform a risk assessment at the beginning 
of the program and review it regularly to prioritize 
analyses, tests, reviews, and activities.   
The amount of mission assurance applied to a project 
affects its cost.  Mission assurance techniques exist for 
all phases of a project from part selection standards to 
how reviews are conducted.  Any activity adds cost, so 
the goal is to identify those that provide the most value.  
At the end of the project, arguably the most important 
goal is that the satellite functions well.  At all stages of 
the project, the greatest concerns to achieving that end 
should be listed, ranked and worked.  In short, ask 
yourself throughout the program, "What keeps me up at 
night?" The answer becomes your risk list and the basis 
for the project schedule.  This directs resources to the 
problems that are front-and-center, but admittedly at the 
expense of the more subtle or latent ones.  
It is prudent to have an awareness of good mission 
assurance practices. Some are easy to implement if the 
right culture is nurtured.  But, in a cost- and schedule-
constrained project, a risk-based mission assurance plan 
directs programs with limited resources where to 
allocate those resources and where to cut back.   
Recommendation #3: Plan for ample Integration, 
Verification, and Test (IV&T) time.  Baseline IV&T to 
be 1/3 to 1/2 of the overall schedule and stick to that.   
Throughout the survey, running out of time and money 
was a constant theme.  This recommendation is a rule-
of-thumb that, if applied, will alleviate a common 
project management failure mode.  The implementation 
of a firewall of budget and schedule starting at IV&T 
also flows backwards: it forces the team to modify and 
potentially de-scope project goals, before design 
complexity starts to endanger the IV&T time.  The start 
of a new project is arguably its most interesting time 
period.  There are a lot of possibilities of how to 
achieve the end goals and about how the program will 
be executed.  Narrowing down those possibilities is an 
art form and must be bounded by a time and or budget 
limit.  If this is not done, then there is less of both for 
the integration phase, where all problems ultimately 
come to light, at the baseline functional test that is 
required before environmental testing can start.  
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During the study interviews, almost all developers 
commented on how the “time crunch factor” 
contributed to on-orbit failure.  The IV&T schedule 
period can arguably be defined as the point at which all 
the hardware is available and working. Projects should 
start testing hardware as it becomes available, as 
components, subassemblies and groups of 
subassemblies. This type of development is called “test 
often and test early.”  The point is to remain skeptical 
that things will work and to test whatever can be tested, 
at the soonest time it can be.   
Recommendation #4: Design for simplicity and 
robustness.  Assume designs will fail and then prove 
they will work. Design the satellite for easy assembly 
and disassembly.  Have respectable margins, robust 
safe modes, few deployables, graceful performance 
degradation, and the ability to perform satellite resets.   
Design problems have many possible solutions.  In 
early trade studies, various parameters are compared, 
and the best solution is selected.  This recommendation 
proposes adding significantly greater weight to the 
parameters of design simplicity and robustness.  The 
inaccessibility of satellites once they are in orbit and the 
single string design of almost all CubeSats, necessitates 
extensive testing for reliability and confidence.  
However, if a design is complicated, then even more 
time is spent both realizing initial functionality and 
subsequently testing for robustness.  Add to this the fact 
that many CubeSat developers do not have access to 
sophisticated analyses and testing.   
An often-overlooked aspect of simple design is a 
consideration for easy assembly and disassembly.  
Despite the best plans and intentions, satellites are often 
taken apart.  If disassembly is a difficult or lengthy 
operation, then that will factor into a decision to fix 
something or take a risk to leave it as is.   
Another aspect of reliable and robust design that is not 
given enough respect is the incorporation of respectable 
margins, in any configuration for thermal performance, 
communications link, and power generation.  All are 
key to a satellite that will operate in space, at its most 
fundamental functional level. 
Finally, rounding out the fundamental attributes of a 
robust design are simple and tested safe modes, 
software reprogrammability and daily satellite resets.  
These characteristics will keep a satellite alive long 
enough for operators to find and correct issues.  
Recommendation #5: Build an experienced team – it 
matters.  A successful team has veteran member(s) 
and frequent informal peer reviews (discussions) with 
proven subject matter experts.   
It is no surprise that a team with prior experience in all 
phases of producing a satellite has a greater chance of 
seeing the effort run smoothly, meeting performance, 
financial and schedule goals.  However, such 
experience is not always available.  The study found 
that successful academic teams had experienced leads 
and mentors as part of the team.  Typically, the satellite 
leads were students that had worked on a satellite in 
their early years, with mentors who had good training in 
the art of systems engineering and program 
management.  Successful academic satellite teams 
sought outside participation in their peer reviews and 
for problem resolution.  Those outside experts filled in 
the team’s knowledge gaps.   
The industry staffing paradigm is different.  Industry 
teams typically have good continuity from project to 
project.  Also, industry teams can hire the skills that 
they specifically need.  However, industry teams were 
less likely to seek outside experts for peer reviews and 
problem resolution because of contracting and 
proprietary knowledge challenges.  This situation is 
compounded because the low cost of CubeSat projects 
limits the team size and knowledge gaps are inevitable.  
To remedy this, successful industry teams had a larger 
pool of employees whom they temporarily borrowed 
for tough issues.  Therefore, solving unique problems or 
assessing the completeness of a design is easier with a 
wide pool of participants.  Academia can take 
advantage of the outside talent pools more easily than 
industry.  Industry should consider working legal and 
contracting issues to simplify bringing experts into their 
project as needed. 
Recommendation #6: Stock spare components.  Extra 
boards support parallel software development and are 
flight spares.  Extra hardware protects schedule 
during mechanical testing.   
The development of a new system is prone to mistakes.  
If hardware is not easy to replace, then an effort must 
be made to avoid errors that might damage it.  
Unfortunately, extra care most often means that less 
testing is done.  CubeSat components are not like 
traditional space hardware: they cost less and are more 
readily available, but their documentation and prior 
testing may be lacking.  Therefore, purchasing spares is 
a cost-effective strategy to protect schedule and to 
increase mission assurance through testing.  A proposal 
for any mission will aim for the lowest cost.  However, 
even though the cost of labor far exceeds hardware cost, 
the hardware budget is often cut.  Spare hardware will 
save a project money in the long run by protecting 
against a schedule slip waiting for damaged hardware to 
be repaired.  The spare hardware can also be used as 
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another development set for parallel work by the 
software team. 
Recommendation #7:  At a minimum, first perform 
these four mission assurance tests: 1) Day-in-the-life 
[or longer] testing; 2) Communication link testing 
with the ground station; 3) Power system charge / 
discharge testing, and 4) Thermal testing (in vacuum 
if at all possible).  Then, perform the tests that have 
the highest risk reduction value for your mission.   
A satellite development has many tests that are 
performed to verify that it meets requirements.  
However, these four tests do more.  When combined 
with robust design margins, they verify that the satellite 
will be functional.  Many developers cited these tests as 
essential, providing the most “bang for the buck.”   
The day-in-the-life (DITL) test validates that satellite 
software is nominally functional, and that the 
combination of hardware and software can perform its 
basic mission.  A mission scenario is simulated, and 
commands are generated in the planning software.  
Those commands are uploaded to the satellite and 
executed automatically with the satellite in a similar 
state as expected on orbit.  The results are downloaded 
at the end of the scenario.  The satellite data from the 
scenario will include payload data and telemetry that is 
inspected to verify that it is “as expected.” 
The communication link test is between the as-built 
flight satellite and a ground station.  Separating the 
satellite and the ground station by a long distance 
provides the bulk of the attenuation, and variable 
attenuators provide the rest.  A file transfer is initiated 
as the link is slowly extinguished.  The total path loss at 
the limit of the link is the demonstrated range.  Make 
sure the attenuation demonstrated makes sense – sneak 
paths are common in RF test configurations that 
simulate long distances.  The ground station should be 
as identical as the one that will be used in flight (or 
better yet, use the real ground equipment), although the 
antenna will generally have reduced gain for the shorter 
range between the satellite and the ground station for 
this test and to reduce the amount of added attenuation. 
CubeSats are small enough that the entire satellite 
power system can be tested at once.  This is an easy yet 
powerful test.  Expose the satellite to sunlight and 
examine the satellite’s telemetry.  The batteries must be 
shown to charge, and the power coming in from the 
solar arrays should be visible in the telemetry.   Verify 
that the satellite batteries can handle the anticipated 
electrical loads when no sunlight is present (eclipse).  
Download satellite telemetry during these tests and 
verify it is correct.   
CubeSat thermal tests verify that components and 
deployments operate properly at temperature and that 
heat paths are sufficient to prevent temperatures outside 
the working limits of satellite systems.  Deployments 
and components often behave differently at thermal 
extremes than at ambient temperatures.  Satellite heat 
loads and thermal paths are often not accurately 
described to thermal engineers or faithfully achieved in 
the satellite build. Also, satellite component loads 
become refined during the electronics development 
phase, rendering the thermal analysis inaccurate.  
Thermal tests at ambient pressure verify the design 
margins on electrical and mechanical subassemblies 
when they are operated at the thermal extremes.  The 
ambient pressure ensures rapid changes and an even 
application of temperature.  If enough cycles are done, 
then it also proves soldering workmanship.  It is often 
done with the batteries not installed or present because 
they severely limit the thermal range of the test.   
The best “like-you-fly” version of thermal testing 
operates the spacecraft in flight-like scenarios in 
vacuum at both thermal extremes.  This verifies that the 
heat loads are properly applied and managed.  Using the 
test results from thermocouples or onboard telemetry, 
the thermal model of the satellite is updated.  This is 
important because the model is used to simulate a wide 
variety of additional configurations and concepts of 
operation.  This test is often done with the batteries 
installed to verify heaters and other battery thermal 
safeguards.  
For all programs, these tests are essential.  The 
likelihood that the satellite will pass them depends on 
how much other quality analysis and testing has already 
occurred.  In resource constrained programs that can 
only afford minimal testing, these tests are a necessary 
go/no-go assessment of whether the satellite 
performance is acceptable or can be fixed in time for 
the delivery to proceed. 
Recommendation #8: Maintain a healthy skepticism 
on vendor subsystem datasheets. Hold margin on all 
performance numbers during design and verify after 
receipt.   
A number of interviewees complained that the 
information in CubeSat component or 
subsystem datasheets was insufficient or inaccurate.  
The CubeSat subsystem industrial base is young and 
many non-military / non-aerospace items haven't been 
flight proven. Holding substantial margin will help 
cover such limitations.   Testing is necessary to confirm 
that the purchased component or subsystem will 
provide the expected and required performance.   
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SUMMARY 
The MAIW study conducted an extensive literature 
review and interviewed 23 organizations across 
government, academia, and industry to identify 
common themes and lessons learned from CubeSat 
programs. From the data gathered, eight actionable 
recommendations were developed to improve mission 
success. The team hopes that many CubeSat programs 
will find value in the results and implement them in 
their future programs.  
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